Qube security explained

How AI copilots see and hear an interview

An interview assistant needs an input before it can suggest an answer. That input can come from the screen, an audio path, shared text, or another device. Understanding the input is the first step in evaluating a protection claim.

Qube · Content reviewed

A screen image can become a text prompt

A tool with access to displayed content can process images or use optical character recognition to extract text. The browser Screen Capture specification describes permissioned capture of display surfaces. Native capture capabilities and restrictions are a separate operating-system question.

This is why a working environment in the cloud is only part of the answer. If it returns an ordinary capturable image, the location of the original files does not by itself stop image analysis on the participant’s side.

An overlay and a capture source are different things

An overlay displays information to its user. Whether that overlay appears in someone else’s screen share depends on the application, capture method, and platform behavior. It does not follow that every recording or every meeting product can detect it.

Microsoft documents window display-affinity controls and explicitly limits what they establish. Apple provides ScreenCaptureKit for screen and audio capture. These APIs are reasons to test the actual platform; they are not proof that every named interview tool uses the same technique or can defeat every control.

Speech has more than one route out

A spoken question can reach a tool through an authorized application integration, a local audio capture path, or a microphone near a speaker. A second device can also hear the surrounding environment. The route determines which protection is relevant.

Headphones can reduce sound reaching the room, but they do not by themselves prove that a local capture path is unavailable. Likewise, observing reduced speaker leakage does not establish that operating-system audio capture has been blocked. Test the visual and audio paths independently.

Compare the boundary that each control changes

Transport encryption addresses interception while data travels. Participant-side encryption can keep a service from reading the meeting content. An isolated cloud workspace changes where tools and files execute. A supported protected-media path can restrict how decoded content is exposed by the client.

Encrypted Media Extensions provides browser interfaces for protected playback; the negotiated system and client implementation determine the resulting protection. An API name alone is not a measured capture result. Qube’s architecture combines trusted cloud execution with conditional protected presentation.

Make a protection test reproducible

Start with the actual browser, operating system, hardware, and session settings. Identify the capture method and record whether the meeting view and audio remain accessible. Test an unsupported or failed-protection case as well as the intended supported case.

Retain the test date, software versions, negotiated policy, and observed result. A successful license exchange, a working video element, or a headless page test does not independently prove that operating-system capture is excluded.

  • Screen or window capture, with a moving visual reference.
  • System-audio or loopback capture as a separate test.
  • An external camera or microphone as a residual physical risk.
  • Failure handling when a client cannot meet the required protection.

Questions before the meeting

Does moving a meeting to the cloud stop all screen capture?

Not by itself. The participant still receives a presentation. Cloud execution and restrictions on that presentation are separate controls, and the actual client must be tested.

Can a tool being invisible in a screen share prove it is undetectable?

No. A screen share is one observation path. Different capture methods, endpoint controls, and physical views expose different information. Claims need a stated method and operating conditions.

Does this page prove that a specific AI copilot bypasses Qube?

No. This guide explains capture boundaries using platform documentation. It does not publish a tool-specific attack test or claim that a named product succeeds or fails against every Qube configuration.

Sources and review method

First-party documentation reviewed on October 18, 2026. Availability can change by plan, client, and rollout. Product documentation describes a capability; it is not an independent security test.

Bring your workflow into Qube

Walk through the room, the shared tools, and the participant devices with us. Agree on the protection and review settings before you use it for sensitive work.

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